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The U.S.-led effort to establish a missile defense architecture for the Persian Gulf has been slower and less 
successful than the United States had hoped, mainly due to an unwillingness and inability to cooperate 
among the Gulf Security Council nations whose nations the system is designed to defend. Given, inter alia, 
Iran’s growing ballistic missile arsenal and unease with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in Gulf 
Arab capitals, security reassurances to the Gulf monarchies will become simultaneously more important and 
more difficult to make credible. In this environment, missile defense will be an important, but by no means 
sufficient, mechanism for assuring the Arab Gulf states. Cooperation on missile defense with the Gulf 
monarchies should continue, but with a realistic understanding of what is possible given the current chaos 





Under President Barack Obama, the United States shifted its missile defense focus from 
protection of the U.S. homeland to protection of forward-deployed U.S. forces and allies from 
regional ballistic missile threats.1 This strategy advocates and requires cooperation from allies; 
without assistance from regional partners, any ballistic missile defense (BMD) assets deployed to 
the region will amount to little more than point defense. The expectation that regional allies 
would move quickly to integrate their various BMD assets, share information, and develop a 
joint doctrine has not materialized, at least not with the speed that the United States had hoped. 
Even in Europe, where the missile defense architecture is being set up through NATO, the 
project has faced problems and limitations. However, the European Phased Adaptive Approach 
(EPAA), as it is called, now seems on target to meet the conclusion of its third phase, based on 
Aegis-equipped ships and Aegis Ashore deployments in Romania and Poland, by the end of 
2020. 
 
In contrast, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has been procuring advanced BMD systems 
and talking about integration of a BMD architecture for the Persian Gulf for years, but little 
progress has been made towards an architecture capable of deterring or defeating the threat posed 
by Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal.  
 
It is unclear if the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),2 the agreement signed by the 
P5+1 and Iran that limits the scope of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief, 
will have a noticeable effect on the GCC’s willingness or ability to take the steps necessary to 
create an effective BMD architecture. The GCC states—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, 
the United Arab Emirates, and Oman—have publicly supported the deal but harbor varying 
degrees of suspicion about the agreement, Iran’s intent to abide by it, and what it may mean for 
regional order.     
 
This paper addresses the following questions: (1) What threats are ballistic missile defense in the 
Persian Gulf designed to address, and how might these threats change or evolve in the aftermath 
of the JCPOA; (2) What is currently being done to create a BMD architecture in the Persian 
Gulf; (3) What obstacles stand in the GCC’s way; (4) What lessons can be learned from the 
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BMD experience in Europe; (5) What role should the United States play in helping the GCC with 
its missile defense project; and (6) What would happen if the United States cut back on its 
commitment to provide BMD capabilities to the GCC? The answers to these questions will have 
implications for the Persian Gulf’s security and the relationship between the United States and its 
Gulf Arab allies.  
 
 
The Iranian Missile Threat and Regional Dynamics Before and After the JCPOA 
 
Ballistic missiles and rockets have a long history in the Middle East. The GCC states first 
witnessed their use during the 1980 – 1988 Iran-Iraq War. Both countries fired ballistic missiles 
at each other’s cities, sowing fear and causing panic, especially on the Iranian side.3 Towards the 
end of the war in 1988, Iraq fired close to 200 ballistic missiles at Iran, killing some 2,000 
people.4 These devastating strikes contributed to Iran’s decision to accept a ceasefire, 
demonstrating the political utility of ballistic missiles when employed against civilian targets. 
Iraq again employed ballistic missiles during the Persian Gulf War in 1991 when it launched 
dozens of Scud missiles at Saudi Arabia and Israel. While Iraq ultimately failed in its attempt to 
goad Israel into the war and thus fragment the U.S.-led coalition that included Arab enemies of 
Israel, it came perilously close. Only the reassuring deployment of Patriot missile defenses to 
Israel, along with strong diplomatic pressure, kept Israel out of the war. The effectiveness of 
Iraq’s missile arsenal did not go unnoticed in GCC capitals. 
 
Iraq’s use of ballistic missiles received the lion’s share of attention in the Arab Gulf from the 
1980s to the early 2000s, but during this time Iran also embarked on a large-scale ballistic 
missile development program. It first acquired Scud missiles from Libya in 1985, and then began 
a ballistic missile development program with assistance from North Korea.5 Iran now possesses 
the largest and most active ballistic missile program in the Middle East, with both short- and 
long-range missiles capable of hitting targets throughout the Gulf and even southern Europe. 
Exact estimates are not available, but it is believed that Iran possesses over 1,000 missiles with 
ranges varying from 150 km to 2,000 km.6    
 
The effectiveness of short-range rockets and missiles was driven home during the summer of 
2006, when Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy organization in Lebanon, fought a month-long war with 
Israel. Hezbollah fired over 4,000 short-range rockets (roughly 25 km) at Israel’s home front 
throughout the war, and despite the Israeli military’s best efforts to stop the barrages, Hezbollah 
was able to continue firing until a UN-imposed ceasefire was agreed to by both sides. Given the 
large number of rockets fired, a relatively small number of Israelis were killed—the rockets were 
unguided and thus unable to strike with any precision—but civilian life in Israel was paralyzed 
as people had to remain in their homes and bomb shelters for over a month. The inability of the 
Israel Defense Forces to stop the rocket fire despite its overwhelming superiority vis-à-vis 
Hezbollah’s guerilla army constituted an embarrassment for Israel and allowed Hezbollah to 
portray itself as the victor.7 Because Hezbollah is an organization funded, supplied, and directed 
by Iran, the Arab Gulf states viewed Hezbollah’s effective use of short-range rockets against 
Israel as a strategy devised by Iran that could one day be employed against them. To counter this 
threat, the GCC states began to acquire U.S.-made BMD systems, and have continued 
purchasing them over the last decade.8       
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On the tactical level, these BMD assets are being procured to complicate Iran’s decision-making 
by reducing its confidence in the effectiveness of missile raids against the Arab Gulf. If the 
GCC’s missile defenses are reasonably effective, the narrative of Iran’s powerful missile force 
striking the vulnerable Gulf monarchies would be turned on its head, constituting a propaganda 
coup for the GCC and an embarrassment for Iran. Instead, the perception would be one of a 
militarily-inferior Iran attempting to attack the more technologically-advanced GCC and failing. 
Again, an example of this can be seen by looking to Israel, where its Iron Dome anti-rocket 
system became a source of pride for Israelis during recent rounds of fighting against Hamas in 
the Gaza Strip.9 The possibility that Iran’s missile strategy might not have the intended effect if it 
were employed can help reduce the coercion value of Iran’s arsenal.  
 
With tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia flaring as of late, the possibility of a military 
confrontation between the two states cannot be ruled out. In such an event, the GCC’s missile 
defenses might actually be called upon to intercept Iranian missiles targeting their territory. This 
is a daunting challenge, and from the vantage point of the GCC, it is likely to become more 
challenging over the coming years because of the concessions made to Iran as part of the 
JCPOA.  
 
UNSCR 2231 (passed to approve the JCPOA and supersede other resolutions pertaining to Iran 
sanctions) states that the embargo on ballistic missiles and associated technology to Iran will be 
removed after eight years, and the embargo on conventional weapons will be lifted after five 
years.10 Iranian officials have made statements asserting that its ballistic missile arsenal and 
development program are not intended to carry weapons of mass destruction and are thus 
“outside the purview or competence of the Security Council resolution and its annexes.”11 Such 
statements signal that Iran will continue to develop the shorter-range systems that will enable 
them to conduct Hezbollah-style attacks against the GCC.  
 
With conventional weapons and ballistic missile restrictions lifted in under a decade, Iran is 
likely to increase not just the quantity but also the quality of its missiles. Reducing the circular 
error probable (CEP) of its missiles and achieving a precision-strike capability will allow Iran to 
hold targets in the Arab Gulf at risk with a higher degree of confidence, and will reduce the 
effectiveness of both active and passive defensive measures.12 Officials in the GCC also worry 
that the restrictions that still remain in place post-JCPOA will not be strictly enforced by the 
P5+1 out of fear that such enforcement may jeopardize Iran’s compliance with its nuclear 
program commitments.  
 
In addition to the military utility of intercepting Iranian missiles, BMD procurement by the GCC 
is also designed to address a political threat: the perception of American retreat from the region 
and realignment towards Iran. One cannot understand the missile defense situation in the region 
post-JCPOA without understanding the unease in Arab Gulf capitals about their security 
relationship with the United States. When the Gulf monarchies assess the United States’ 
commitment to the region, they see a country exhausted after a decade of war and occupation in 
Iraq and a country whose ability to intervene in the region is severely limited by domestic anti-
war constraints. They also see the United States shifting its focus to the Asia-Pacific region, a 
policy referred to in the United States as the “pivot to Asia.”13 The Gulf monarchies see this 
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loudly proclaimed shift in policy as an American “east of Suez” declaration, making U.S. 
guarantees to defend their security less credible. Adding to their fears of a wholesale U.S. retreat 
from the region was the U.S. response to the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011, particularly what the 
Gulf regimes viewed as the abandonment of Egypt’s president and longtime U.S. ally, Hosni 
Mubarak. In a region of the world where a ruler’s or a ruling family’s hold on power is the most 
important security concern, the U.S. response to the Arab Spring created profound distrust and 
led many to question if the United States could truly be counted on to assist its authoritarian 
partners if their rule were endangered.  
 
It is within this landscape of mistrust and fear that Iran’s missile arsenal has grown and still 
grows larger and more sophisticated. Accordingly, BMD systems are procured not just to deter 
and potentially blunt Iranian missile strikes, but to keep the U.S. military and defense contractors 
integrated into the region’s security architecture.14 As the Arab Gulf states detected signs of 
American realignment away from the region, they also detected the Obama administration’s shift 
towards regional missile defense and its enthusiasm for missile defense as a substitute for other 
forms of extended deterrence. Signing on to the Obama administration’s regional BMD aims 
became a way to keep the military-to-military relationships strong. Purchasing the launchers, 
interceptors, and radars that comprise these BMD systems also kept U.S. industry focused on the 
region.15 The political component to the GCC’s interest in missile defense has always been 
significant. With the signing of the JCPOA, the GCC’s interest in missile defense is likely to be 
strengthened on both the military and political front. 
 
 
Current Status and Future Plans for GCC Missile Defense 
 
All of the GCC states have purchased or will purchase U.S.-made BMD systems (see Table 1). 
Some states have operated such systems for many years, and are upgrading their systems to 
better meet current challenges. Others are buying them for the first time. In 2013, the Obama 
administration allowed the GCC to purchase weapons collectively in a traditional American 
effort to foster cooperation and interoperability and the same arrangement the United States 
shares with its NATO allies—but so far they have only purchased weapons individually.16 The 
United Arab Emirates operates Patriot PAC-3 batteries and missiles, and Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia are upgrading their PAC-2 batteries and interceptors to PAC-3.17 Qatar has plans to 
deploy its own PAC-3 batteries as well. PAC-3, the most advanced iteration of the Patriot, is 
designed to defend small areas from ballistic missile attack with a hit-to-kill interceptor. For 
defending larger areas, the United Arab Emirates purchased the Terminal High-Altitude Area 
Defense (THAAD) system, and Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia have all expressed interest in 
acquiring the system.18 In addition to the BMD systems deployed by the GCC states, the United 
States also operates its own missile defenses in the region. The United States has two PAC-3 
batteries each in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.19 At sea, the U.S. Navy 
operates Aegis-equipped destroyers armed with SM-3 interceptors capable of defending against 
short- and intermediate-range missiles by intercepting them above the atmosphere.20 All of this 
amounts to a substantial amount of missile defense hardware in the region.  
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Table 1: Missile Defense Systems in the Persian Gulf21 
Country U.S. Deployments in 
Gulf Countries 
Deployed or Awaiting 
Delivery 
In Acquisition or 
Considering 






PAC-3 PAC-3, THAAD None 
Qatar PAC-3, FBX radar None PAC-3, THAAD 
Bahrain PAC-3 None None 
Kuwait PAC-3 PAC-2 upgrade to 
PAC-3 
None 
Oman None None THAAD 
Gulf Theater Aegis SM-3 N/A N/A 
 
 
Senior Obama administration officials, including former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and 
former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, have pushed for these BMD systems to be integrated 
together to provide a robust BMD capability in the region. For reasons described below, this has 
not yet happened. However, in the aftermath of the Iran negotiations, the Obama administration 
and the Gulf monarchies have issued public statements renewing their commitment to this 
objective. In a joint statement released by the White House after the U.S.-GCC Summit at Camp 
David in May of 2015, the parties “committed to develop a region-wide ballistic missile defense 
capability, including through the development of a ballistic missile early warning system.”22 The 
United States also agreed to conduct a study of the BMD capabilities in the region and assist 
with the development of the early warning system. The statement also committed the parties to 
“undertake a senior leader tabletop exercise to examine improved regional ballistic missile 
defense cooperation.”23 It remains to be seen if the JCPOA will lead the GCC states to purchase 




Obstacles on the Road to Integration  
 
One of the great paradoxes of the Obama administration’s regional BMD strategy is that less 
threatened regional actors have made greater progress on BMD integration than more threatened 
regional actors. The EPAA, the regional missile defense architecture being implemented through 
NATO, is the most advanced regional system despite the fact that Iran does not yet have the 
ability to strike most of Europe (and the system is not designed for, nor does it have a capability 
against, Russia’s strategic deterrent).24 In contrast, Iran does have a substantial—and growing—
capability to strike at targets in the GCC, yet progress towards integration within the GCC has 
been far slower and more complicated than in Europe. This can be explained primarily by three 
factors: a strong disinclination towards cooperation within the GCC; ineffective organizational 
structures within the GCC militaries; and bureaucratic obstacles that inhibit cooperation between 
the GCC and the United States.  
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Disinclination towards Cooperation within the GCC 
A full treatment of the history of the GCC, its ruling families, and its political culture is beyond 
the scope of this paper, and can be found elsewhere,25 but a basic understanding of these issues is 
key to realizing why the political cooperation necessary for achieving an integrated BMD system 
is so difficult in the Persian Gulf. The most important facet of the region’s security dynamics is 
the primacy of regime security. While the Arab Gulf monarchies certainly face external 
conventional threats—of which Iran is first and foremost—their primary security concern is their 
regimes’ ability to stay in power, and often times the biggest threats to regime security in the 
Persian Gulf are not from adversary nations’ military capabilities. Due to a long history of tribal 
rivalries, border disputes, and divergent security and economic interests, the six members of the 
GCC view each other with suspicion.26 Fears abound about neighbors interfering in each other’s 
internal affairs, leading to an atmosphere that makes close cooperation difficult. Fear of Saudi 
dominance among the smaller GCC states also precludes close cooperation—a structural issue 
given Saudi Arabia’s much larger size, population, and global political clout. Attempts at 
information sharing and integrated command and control have been, and will continue to be, 
hampered by constant suspicions of Saudi infringement on the sovereignty of the other states, 
especially in light of King Salman’s more activist foreign policy.  
 
Lastly, but no less important, is the chaos and reordering of the Middle East that has been 
unfolding since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Arab Spring uprisings that began in 
2011. Different GCC states (particularly Qatar) have had and continue to have strong 
disagreements about how to handle the instability in Egypt and the civil war in Syria. Tensions 
have gotten so bad at times that three GCC states withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar over 
anger at Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and divergent foreign policy.27 Such strong 
disagreements about pressing regional security issues, coupled with a history of mistrust within 
the GCC, make cooperation on a project as complicated and compromise-intensive as missile 
defense an extremely difficult endeavor, even with the threat from Iran looming ever larger. 
 
Organizational Structures of the Arab Gulf Militaries 
The GCC’s member states are often lumped together when in fact there are many important 
differences between them. However, they do share certain traits in common, including dynastic 
rule that relies on oil income for its budgets and to provide largesse to its citizens. Peculiarities in 
the development of many state and societal institutions have resulted from this form of 
governance, including the GCC’s militaries and security services.28 As stated earlier, the top 
priority of these governments is regime security and the ruling family’s hold on power. Thus, the 
militaries and security services of these monarchies are designed with “coup-proofing” in 
mind—the structuring of the armed forces in such a way that prevents their ability to harm or 
overthrow the regime.29 Some such strategies for achieving this include: deliberately keeping 
certain units weak and unprofessional; limiting communication between units; creating multiple 
security and intelligence services to surveil and protect against each other; and placing regime 
loyalists in leadership roles. In the GCC, military leadership positions are often awarded to 
balance or reward different factions of the ruling family. This creates parallel military forces 
with unnecessary redundancy, commanded by (sometimes unqualified) members of the royal 
family who jealously guard their turf. Such organizational structures may prevent the military 
from posing an internal threat to the regime and serve as an effective vehicle for patronage, but it 
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is not conducive to cooperation, either between units in the same military or between the GCC’s 
militaries.   
 
Authoritarian states that face significant external threats, or for whom territorial expansion is 
integral to the regime, often avoid falling prey to the coup-proofing strategies that result in poor 
military performance.30 Given the chaotic nature of the Middle East, the Arab Gulf states 
certainly face external threats, so why haven’t they adopted the model of authoritarian regimes 
with effective militaries? There are two possible reasons for this. First, the tribal and sectarian 
fault lines that run deep through the region mandate security forces that are inherently more 
inward-focused than might be necessary in other regions. Second, the Arab Gulf states receive 
protection from external threats from the United States, which has a decades-long history of 
providing security for the region.31 Of late, the faith of the GCC states in the commitment of the 
United States to the region is shaky, but these militaries all developed under the protection of the 
American security umbrella. The legacy effects of this development will be difficult to 
overcome. Little has been specifically written on how the organizational structures of the Arab 
Gulf militaries have affected missile defense cooperation, but it is safe to say that it has played a 
role, perhaps a significant one, in retarding integration and interoperability across the GCC.  
 
Bureaucratic Obstacles between the United States and the GCC 
Another, although lesser, factor in the GCC’s difficulty in progressing towards an interoperable 
BMD system is bureaucratic obstacles with the United States. U.S.-GCC relations are close, but 
suffer symptoms of a patron-client alliance structure—one between a strong democratic state and 
a series of weak authoritarian ones. The authoritarian and regime security-oriented nature of 
these monarchies has limited the United States’ willingness to sell or transfer certain 
technologies to these countries for fear that they may be used inappropriately or they will find 
their way into a third party’s hands. This fear is compounded by the fact that many of the non-
state actors of great concern to the United States, such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, have 
sympathizers within the GCC’s societies and militaries. Many officials in the GCC find the slow 
and sometimes fickle nature of U.S. equipment and technology transfer that results from these 
considerations—in addition to the already slow and complex export controls process—insulting 
and unhelpful towards building effective regional capabilities. This is an issue of contention in 
U.S.-GCC relations overall that has likely impacted cooperation on present missile defense 
plans.    
 
 
Lessons from the EPAA and their Salience in the Gulf 
 
In light of the difficulties facing missile defense in the Persian Gulf, what lessons might be 
gleaned from the more advanced and robust regional missile defense project in Europe, the 
EPAA? Obvious differences aside, there are some structural parallels between the strategic 
picture in Europe and in the Persian Gulf. Both NATO and the GCC are collections of states that 
fear a regional adversary in close proximity to their borders, and both view missile defense as a 
political instrument, not just or even primarily as a military instrument. If the development of the 
EPAA is any indication, there are two main lessons to be learned with implications for the Arab 
Gulf.  
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First, while missile defense is a capability of great interest, it is not a substitute for other 
capabilities that regional allies deem essential to deterrence and their security.32 Many NATO 
allies are growing increasingly concerned about Russia’s behavior given its actions in Ukraine 
and its more aggressive interference of NATO airspace. Vis-à-vis Russia, the EPAA’s value is in 
the physical presence of U.S. personnel and equipment since the interceptors do not threaten 
Russia’s nuclear deterrent. But they also do not counter the capabilities Russia might bring to 
bear in any future action—hybrid or otherwise—against a NATO ally. Countries within the 
NATO alliance, especially those closer to Russia, are seeking more offensive weapons that 
would actually be capable of complicating a Russian ground invasion of their territory—
something missile defense does not do and indeed cannot do in its present configuration. Missile 
defense is an important political demonstration of commitment, but is insufficient by itself in the 
face of increasing Russian hostility. 
 
A similar paradigm exists in the Persian Gulf. Missile defenses respond to a more direct and 
immediate threat in the Persian Gulf than they do in Europe, but they are not a substitute for the 
greater diplomatic and military role the GCC states wish the United States would play in the 
region. As Saudi Arabia battles Houthi rebels in Yemen and remains fearful of Iran’s control 
over Shiite militias in Iraq and elsewhere, the Arab Gulf states are most interested in U.S. 
diplomatic efforts to counter Iran’s growing influence, as well as more advanced strike 
capabilities to enable greater unilateral conventional action. Selling additional BMD assets to the 
GCC states will not make up for the fact that they perceive U.S. diplomatic pressure on Iran to be 
diminishing, or the fact that strike capabilities are subject to slow and complex export regulations 
and concerns about Israel’s qualitative military edge.33  
 
Second, the EPAA project demonstrates how difficult BMD cooperation and integration is, even 
under more favorable political conditions. Different NATO allies have different perceptions of 
the threats posed by Russia and Iran, which makes some countries more motivated to contribute 
to the EPPA than others. On the BMD integration and cooperation front, NATO, despite having 
a long history of cooperation and higher levels of trust, has still run into difficulties. A 
Government Accountability Office report from 2014 highlights many of these challenges, 
including an incident where Patriot batteries deployed to Turkey were unable to be used for 
weeks due to a lack of prior planning and preparation.34 Uncoordinated practices and procedures, 
and intelligence-sharing restrictions, created an embarrassing situation between close allies on a 
project that has been a main focus for the alliance. If NATO’s more advanced EPAA is suffering 
from such cooperation difficulties, it is unlikely that the GCC states will fare better.  
 
 
The U.S. Role in the Persian Gulf Going Forward  
 
In light of American interests, U.S. BMD objective in the region—encouraging integration and 
interoperability to create a region-wide missile defense architecture that is greater than the sum 
of its parts—is the correct objective. But the United States should have no illusions that this will 
be achieved quickly, or even at all. It is possible that the anxiety in Arab Gulf capitals caused by 
the JCPOA will result in a renewed and good-faith effort by the GCC states to engage in the 
information sharing and joint doctrine development that are necessary for BMD interoperability. 
But it is also possible that continued differences on regional security issues and structural 
Missile Defense, Extended Deterrence, and Nonproliferation in the 21st Century | Paper 6                   9 
deficiencies in their militaries will continue to stifle progress toward BMD interoperability, even 
post-JCPOA. Given this reality, the United States must temper its expectations and focus on two 
shorter-term objectives that will have quicker returns on both the military and political fronts.  
The first focus should be a serious push for the information sharing necessary for a region-wide 
early warning system. This objective was specifically singled out during President Obama’s May 
2015 summit with GCC leaders. A region-wide early warning capability would consist of the 
radars and other sensors in other GCC countries (and linked to U.S. assets in the region) talking 
to each other. It would not involve the sharing of interceptors or a joint doctrine for regional 
defense. This is a first step towards true regional defense, and should be achievable in a shorter 
timeframe with a committed U.S. effort.  But it would have a meaningful impact on each state’s 
ability to unilaterally defend itself with its own interceptors. Due to the short missile flight times 
in the region (six minutes or less) and the topography, the earlier an incoming missile can be 
detected and tracked, the easier it will be to shoot down that missile. If a threat heading for one 
country is detected first by a radar in another country, it would be extremely valuable if this 
information could be shared in real time to enable the threatened country to better defend itself.35  
 
The second focus should be improving the United States’ own interoperability. Currently, 
different BMD systems operated by the U.S. military are unable to talk to each other. This makes 
it difficult to use the best interceptor to defeat the incoming threat. Northrop Grumman is 
currently working on an Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS) 
that will enable the sensors associated with different BMD systems to communicate, alerting the 
warfighter and enabling him or her to select the best interceptor available to engage the incoming 
missile.36 However, the IBCS is not slated to reach initial operational capacity until 2019.37 
Efforts should be made to speed up the development and procurement of this system. Talks 
should begin now with the GCC states about selling them the system to improve the capabilities 
of the BMD assets they already (or will soon) operate.  
 
 
Consequences of a Reduced U.S. Role on Regional Missile Defense 
 
Reducing the U.S. role in assisting the GCC states with missile defense will have strong 
operational and political consequences. Operationally, the GCC states rely on the United States 
to sell them BMD equipment and help them operate it. Even under a dramatically reduced 
presence in the region, it is unlikely that such sales and military-to-military cooperation will 
cease. However, any BMD integration that may take place within the GCC in the future will rely 
heavily on U.S. leadership and persistent pressure and involvement. Failing to provide such 
leadership will result in slower progress towards BMD integration than already exists today.  
 
Even more pronounced would be the political consequences. U.S.-GCC relations are already at a 
relatively low point—any backtracking on an issue that concerns them, such as missile defense, 
would be interpreted as a validation of GCC suspicions of American abandonment. This 
perception has already had an effect on GCC behavior. Saudi Arabia’s campaign in Yemen 
would likely not be taking place were it not for the Kingdom’s anger at Washington’s thawing 
relations with Iran and (from its perspective) inaction against Bashar al-Assad in Syria and the 
Islamic State. BMD cooperation has been one of the few areas where the United States has 
shown a willingness to increase its involvement in the region. Reducing this role, for whatever 
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reason, would be catastrophic for U.S.-GCC relations, and could have consequences in the 





The Obama administration’s objective of BMD integration in the region is moving slower than 
expected, and may not be achievable in a reasonable timeframe. The United States should focus 
on smaller steps—such as an integrated early warning system—that would be valuable but would 
fall short of true interoperability. The United States must also realize that missile defense will not 
serve as an effective substitute for other forms of assurance and cooperation that the Arab Gulf 
states feel is necessary for their security. Missile defense is an important, but by no means 
sufficient, mechanism of extended deterrence. In the absence of additional forms of security 
assistance, including the more assertive U.S. leadership role that the GCC states desire from the 
United States, missile defense will not serve as a credible commitment to the security of the Arab 
Gulf monarchies. That being said, the goal of a regional missile defense architecture is a worthy 
one. The United States should continue working towards this goal—albeit with a realistic 
understanding of what is achievable given the realities of the region.         
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Timeline 
 
1980 – 1988: Ballistic missiles widely used by Iraq and Iran during their eight-year war. Ballistic 
missiles used by Iraq against Iran’s capital, Tehran, were extremely effective and contributed to 
Iran’s decision to accept a ceasefire. 
 
1981: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman form the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) to address growing regional instability. 
 
1991: Iraq again uses ballistic missiles, this time against Saudi Arabia and Israel. Little damage 
was caused, but their use by Saddam Hussein demonstrated the political utility of ballistic 
missiles.  
 
2006: Hezbollah fires 4,000 rockets into northern Israel, again demonstrating the political value 
of even short-range and unguided rocket and missile strikes.  
 
2006: The George W. Bush administration launches the Gulf Security Dialogue to strengthen 
U.S.-GCC defense cooperation. Missile defense is an important item on the agenda.  
 
2010: The U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Review shifts U.S. policy toward a greater emphasis on 
regional defense systems, including in the Persian Gulf.  
 
2011: The United Arab Emirates becomes the first foreign customer of the Terminal High-
Altitude Area Defense missile defense system.  
 
2012: The Barack Obama administration established the Gulf Strategic Cooperation Forum to 
enhance security cooperation. Missile defense issues have featured prominently in Strategic 
Cooperation Forum discussions.  
 
2013: The P5+1 and Iran agree to the Joint Plan of Action, which consisted of a short-term 
freeze on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief to provide both parties with 
space to negotiate a final agreement.  
 
2015: The P5+1 sign the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which provides Iran with 
sanctions relief in exchange for limits on its nuclear program. Iran’s ballistic missile program 
and state sponsorship of terrorism were not dealt with sufficiently according to many of Iran’s 
Arab neighbors.  
 
2016: Iran conducts ballistic missile tests after the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan 
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